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This article considers comparable and near contemporaneous competition reforms in 
modernising Dutch and English healthcare: specifically, the development of sectoral 
regulators – the Dutch Healthcare Authority in 2006 and NHS Improvement as a result of the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012 reforms - with a competition focus and a defined 
relationship with the competition authorities. Despite distinctions between the Dutch 
health insurance system and the taxation-funded National Health Service in England, there 
are sufficient common aspects evident in competition policy development and the 
functional equivalence of the new sectoral regulators to make this comparative analysis 
beneficial for those interested in competition policy and healthcare modernisation.  
The aim of this article is to examine two factors shaping the competition focus of the 
sectoral regulators and their relationship with the competition authorities: the regulators’ 
focus on patients and evolving ministerial oversight of healthcare modernisation. These 
factors are significant because they reveal not only tensions in equating patients and 
consumers, but also counterintuitive developments in the two countries. Taken together, 
these factors help explain why implementation of competition reforms in Dutch and English 
healthcare has proven difficult, so provide a better understanding for subsequent 
developments in both countries, or for other countries considering similar reforms.   
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Both the Netherlands and England have recently experimented with developing competition 
as a means to modernise their healthcare systems and meet ongoing challenges such as 
rising costs and increasing innovation. This need for healthcare system modernisation is 
emerging regardless of healthcare system type: the Netherlands represents an example of 
an insurance-based system, while English1 healthcare comprises the taxation-funded 
National Health Service (NHS) which provides the majority of healthcare on the one hand, 
and the smaller, supplementary private healthcare market2 underpinned by private medical 
insurance and self-paying patients on the other.  
This distinction between insurance-based and taxation-funded3 healthcare system models 
has implications for the development of competition reforms. In Dutch healthcare these 
include the introduction of mandatory private health insurance in 2006 and the 
liberalisation of some hospital service prices. In England there have been successive 
competition-based reforms of the NHS, inter alia to expand private sector delivery of NHS 
services and promote patient choice, culminating recently in the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 (HSCA 2012). Unsurprisingly, this distinction was also evident in the extent to which 
the Netherlands and England were inspired by “managed competition” – in essence, a 
purchasing strategy to obtain maximum value for consumers using rules for competition4 – 
a model developed by the US health economist Alain Enthoven. Whereas the Dutch 
healthcare reforms of 2006 have been considered a “living model of managed 
competition”,5 the approach to competition in the English NHS has been more piecemeal, 
encompassing not only Enthoven’s recommendation of separating purchasing and providing 
                                                          
1 The reference to England is explicit in light of divergent management of, and approaches to, the National 
Health Service (NHS) across the United Kingdom. 
2 Which is UK-wide in its scope. 
3 Reference is made throughout the article to “insurance-based” and “taxation-funded” healthcare system 
models in preference to “Bismarck” and “Beveridge” models. This is due in part to the narrow focus of the 
article on competition regulation, where a key factor is how solidarity is handled, as distinct from wider 
features of these designations, and also to an apparent ambivalence about the ongoing use of these 
designations. See further on healthcare system typologies, Tamara K. Hervey and Jean V. McHale, European 
Union Health Law – Themes and Implications (CUP 2015). “EU internal health law: the systemic focus”, pages 
211-226.  
4 Alain C. Enthoven, “The History and Principles of Managed Competition” (1993) Health Affairs 12(1) 24. 
5 Alain C. Enthoven, “A Living Model of Managed Competition: A Conversation with Dutch Health Minister Ab 
Klink” (2008) Health Affairs 28(3) 196.  
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functions, 6 but also the conflation of these - ultimately in the Clinical Commissioning Groups 
introduced by the HSCA 2012. 
Despite the differences between the Dutch and English healthcare systems, common 
elements can be found in their development of competition reflecting the experience of 
opening other sectors up to competition. Most notably, both countries’ reforms included 
the establishment of sectoral regulators – the Dutch Healthcare Authority7  and NHS 
Improvement.8 These are independent agencies with a twofold competition remit: to 
develop scope for competition sometimes in connection with the Ministers for Health, and 
to work with the competition authorities to police anticompetitive behaviour, typically by 
reference to general competition law (the provisions governing anticompetitive agreements 
and abuse of dominance at national and EU levels).9  This twofold remit – which situates the 
healthcare regulators between government and competition authority - has proved 
problematic in light of the idea that there may still remain unresolved tensions between a 
universalist model of health service emphasizing the principles of equal access and equal 
treatment of patients, and a market-driven model emphasizing efficiency, innovation, and 
patient choice.10 
The experience of other sectors has also been instrumental in developing the sectoral 
regulators for healthcare. This finds reflection, for example, in the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority initially being granted a competence to investigate significant market power,11 a 
concept developed in the context of EU telecommunications regulation. This competence 
was intended to complement the power of the Authority for Consumers and Markets12  to 
investigate abuse of dominance, but an absence of such cases has been attributed to the 
blurred distinction between the two competences.13 In England, NHS Improvement shares 
                                                          
6 Alain C. Enthoven, “Reflections on the management of the National Health Service – An American looks at 
incentives to efficiency in health services management in the UK” The Nuffield Trust 4 October 1985. 
7 Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit (NZa). 
8 Formerly known as Monitor. 
9 Articles 101 and 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), transposed by Articles 6 and 24 
Dutch Competition Act 1998 (Mededingingswet, Mw) and Sections 2 and 18 Competition Act 1998 (CA 98) 
(also known as the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions) in the UK.  
10 Tony Prosser, The Limits of Competition Law (Oxford 2005), page 9. 
11 Originally under Articles 47-49 Wmg. 
12 Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM). 
13 Wolf Sauter, ‘The balance between competition law and regulation in Dutch healthcare markets’ (2014) 
TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2014-041. 
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“concurrent powers” – effectively an equal competence – with the Competition and 
Markets Authority to apply general competition law14 by analogy with sectoral regulators 
such as Ofgem in the energy sector.  
This article starts from the premise that this template – of looking to other sectors - for 
developing sectoral regulators in healthcare was too simple. A comparative methodology is 
used to explore other common factors instrumental in shaping the competition focus of the 
new healthcare regulators and their relationship with the competition authorities. In so doing, 
it is submitted that a better insight is gained into why “healthcare” may be distinguished from 
other sectors, and that there may yet be further considerations emerging in light of significant 
differences between Dutch and English healthcare. 
The primary purpose of this article is to explore two factors shaping the regulators’ 
competition focus and specifically their relationship with the competition authorities. 
Firstly, the healthcare regulators’ apparent focus on patients – as distinct from, for example, 
healthcare providers - as defined in statute. This highlights that new directions for regulator 
legitimacy evident in the Netherlands15 may also hold for England. 
Secondly, the wider evolution of ministerial oversight and expansion of the competition 
authorities’ roles in healthcare. This reveals the emergence of counterintuitive 
developments in the two countries, which is underscored in England by wider HSCA 2012 
reforms which reduce ministerial oversight and create NHS England as the body responsible 
for day-to-day management of the NHS.16 
These factors have received at best limited attention thus far, so the present article builds 
on previous considerations of general frameworks for competition, wider perceptions of 
declining government intervention and increasing regulatory oversight17 and significant 
changes to the constitutional framework by the HSCA 2012 reforms.18 
                                                          
14 Section 72 HSCA 2012. 
15 Wolf Sauter, 'Is the general consumer interest a source of legitimacy for healthcare regulation? An analysis 
of the Dutch experience' [2009] 2-3 European Journal of Consumer Law 419-434. 
16 Section 9 HSCA 2012. NHS England was initially known as “the NHS Commissioning Board”. 
17 Tony Prosser, “Regulation and Legitimacy”, in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds.), The Changing Constitution, 7th 
edition (Oxford 2011), ch.12. 
18 A.C.L. Davies, “This Time, It’s For Real” (2013) M.L.R. 76(3) 564. 
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The unique contribution made by this article is to provide a comparative perspective on 
these two factors in order to move beyond the view that common features link “healthcare” 
as a sector with, for example, energy or telecoms, and to articulate that the specificities of 
individual healthcare systems – even within the broader insurance-based / taxation-funded 
system typologies  – may need to find expression within the competition function of the 
healthcare regulators and particularly their relationship with the competition authorities.  
This examination is timely in view of the current potential for change in both countries. The 
constitution of a new government in the Netherlands following the general election in 
March 2017 raises questions about whether the refocusing of competition will happen in 
the way originally envisaged by legislative proposals in the 2015-16 parliamentary session. 
These involved the transfer of the majority of the Dutch Healthcare Authority’s competition 
functions to the Authority for Consumers and Markets.19 In England, the House of Lords has 
recently called for a Department of Health consultation to review the HSCA 2012 reforms,20 
and there is a growing recognition of the limited role for competition in the development of 
new integrated care models in the NHS21 outlined by the NHS Five Year Forward View in 
2014 and currently implemented by Sustainability and Transformation Plans.  
The article develops as follows. Section II outlines the comparative approach underpinning 
the present discussions by considering in overview differences and similarities in the 
development of competition and how it functions in Dutch and English healthcare. Section 
III examines the regulators’ apparent focus on patients as defined by the concept of the 
“general consumer interest” in the Netherlands and in light of the distinctions drawn 
between NHS patients and private patients in England. Section IV considers the evolving role 
of Ministerial oversight and the expanding role of the competition authorities in both 
countries. Section V concludes. 
                                                          
19 Kamerstukken II, 2015-16, 34 445,  Wijziging van de Wet marktordening gezondheidszorg en enkele andere 
wetten in verband met aanpassingen van de tarief- en prestatieregulering en het markttoezicht op het terrein 
van de gezondheidszorg. (Second Chamber documentation, Parliamentary Session 2015-16, 34 445, 
Amendments to the Wmg and other laws to apply tariff regulation and market regulation in healthcare). 
20 House of Lords Select Committee on the Long-Term Sustainability of the NHS. Report of Session 2016-17, 
“The Long-term Sustainability of the NHS and Adult Social Care”, 5 April 2017. Recommendation 4 (Paragraph 
101). 
21 Evident in the Competition and Markets Authority’s recent comments in connection with the Central 




 II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION AND SECTORAL REGULATION IN DUTCH 
AND ENGLISH HEALTHCARE 
The distinction between the Netherlands as representing an insurance-based healthcare 
system and England as a taxation-funded healthcare system has implications for the 
development of competition. In essence, it is considered that, in a supply-driven, tax-based 
system, governments are likely to determine the precise levels of benefits, whereas 
governments that rely on a health insurance scheme are more likely to leave some room for 
demand-driven competition with regard to the benefits that the insured persons are 
entitled to (for instance, based on supplementary insurance).22 Thus competition within the 
English NHS is restricted: the ability of NHS patients to exercise choice of provider is limited, 
for example, to certain elective care services.23 In the Netherlands, there has been a greater 
focus on competition in the market as Dutch patients can choose their health insurer and, 
depending on the type of policy selected (and cost paid), have a lesser or greater choice of 
healthcare provider. It may also be possible to speak of competition in the market in 
England insofar as patients move between the NHS and private healthcare sector for 
treatment. However, the competition reforms of the HSCA 2012 focus primarily on the NHS, 
not the private healthcare market.  
Nevertheless, despite this significant distinction in the scope for developing competition in 
Dutch and English healthcare, there are similarities which influence the regulator role and 
competition focus. This section first sets out the context of competition in Dutch and English 
healthcare which inevitably emphasizes difference, before outlining two significant 
underlying similarities and considering the framework within which the regulators operate 
which is arguably defined by the applicability of competition law. 
A. Competition in Dutch healthcare 
The Dutch system of mandatory private health insurance is underpinned by interaction 
between patients, healthcare providers and health insurers and associated markets. This 
can be illustrated by a “healthcare triangle” 24 as follows: 
                                                          
22 Leigh Hancher and Wolf Sauter, EU Competition and Internal Market Law in the Health Care Sector (OUP 
2012), pages  232-3. 
23 Rather, the focus is on competition for the market (procurement activity), which is beyond the scope of this 
article. See further, Office of Health Economics (OHE), Competition and the English NHS. January 2012. 












Figure 1: the Dutch “healthcare triangle”. 
In essence, the framework established by the Dutch Health Insurance Act 200625  requires all 
adults living and working in the Netherlands to take out a basic package of health insurance, 
and this underpins the development of a competitive health insurance market. From this, it 
was intended that competition will filter through to healthcare provision markets as insurers 
try to gain competitive advantage by securing the best deal possible from healthcare 
providers, and that consultants would be put under pressure to provide high quality 
competitive services by provider combinations such as hospitals.26 Within this system, 
patients provide an impetus for competition by exercising choice of health insurer and 
depending upon the type of policy chosen – “reimbursement”, “combination” or “benefits in 
kind” – will have a greater or lesser choice of healthcare provider.  
B. Competition in English healthcare 
In order to understand the HSCA 2012 (and wider NHS competition) reforms, it is essential 
to be aware of the paradoxical scope for both distinction and cooperation between the 
English NHS and private healthcare sector.  This includes the possibility for an individual to 
move between the two (insofar as they are eligible for NHS treatment), and be classified as 
                                                          
25 Zorgverzekeringswet (Zvw). 
26 Wolf Sauter, “Experiences from the Netherlands: The Application of Competition Rules in Health Care”, in J. 





















either an “NHS patient” or a “private patient”, subject to Department of Health and latterly 
NHS England rules.27  
Market-based reforms of the English NHS began with the separation of purchasing and 
providing functions by the “NHS internal market” in 1991.28 Since then, it has been possible 
to conceptualise the interactions between the NHS and private healthcare sector as 





Figure 2: Relationship between the NHS and PH sectors as demonstrated by the purchaser/provider separation. 
In essence, categories 1 and 2 comprise the NHS and treatment of NHS patients by NHS 
providers30 (category 1) or private/voluntary sector providers of NHS services, such as 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres – private clinics dedicated to treating NHS patients 
(category 2). Correspondingly, categories 3 and 4 relate to the private healthcare sector and 
treatment of private patients by private providers – for example, private patient units within 
NHS hospitals (category 3) or private hospitals (category 4).  
Following the introduction of the NHS Five Year Forward View in 2014 there has been an 
emphasis on integrated models of care which are currently being implemented via 
                                                          
27 Department of Health, ‘Guidance on NHS patients who wish to pay for additional private care’, 23 March 
2009. NHS Commissioning Board (now NHS England), ‘Commissioning Policy: Defining the boundaries between 
NHS and Private Healthcare’. April 2013. Ref: NHSCB/CP/12. 
28 Elaborated by the White Paper, “Working for Patients” and introduced by the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act 1990. 
29 These have also been used to delineate the private healthcare market and discuss the applicability of 
competition law. See, respectively, Office of Fair Trading (OFT), “Private Healthcare Market Study”, December 
2011, OFT1396 at page13, and Okeoghene Odudu, “Competition Law and the National Health Service” 
(Competition Bulletin: Competition Law Views from Blackstone Chambers, 8 October 2012). 
30 Secondary care providers (typically hospitals and ambulance services) within the NHS have operated as “NHS 
Trusts” since 1990 or as “NHS Foundation Trusts” since 2003. Although successive government policy was for 
NHS Trusts to achieve greater financial autonomy and Foundation Trust status between approximately 2004 
and 2014, the introduction of the NHS Five Year Forward View and new integrated care models suggests that 
alternative conceptions are emerging, such as Accountable Care Organisations. These may include primary 
care providers such as GPs. These have had an independent status so might be considered to belong in 
category 2 as much as category 1. 
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Sustainability and Transformation Plans. These have been hailed by the CEO of NHS England 
as marking the end of the separation of purchasing and providing functions.31 However, the 
underlying distinction between the NHS and private sector remains pertinent with regard to 
discussions of competition, particularly as the nature of these markets differs.  
The development of market-based reforms led to the NHS being described as a “quasi-
market”: a concept which can share various common features with “standard” markets 
(such as competition and the use of financial incentives),32 but can also be distinguished on 
both the demand and supply side.33 Thus purchasers typically comprise the state via agents 
(NHS Commissioners), rather than patients using their own resources, while providers may 
include both not-for-profit as well as for-profit organisations. As there is evidence in 2017 of 
ongoing governmental commitment34 to maintaining the NHS as a service based on clinical 
need, not the ability to pay, the designation of the NHS as a “quasi-market” remains apt 
since the HSCA 2012 reforms do not change this underlying characteristic. 
In contrast, the private healthcare market is more akin to standard markets in light of the 
greater scope for provider entry and exit and as “self-pay” patients use their own resources. 
A failure to engage with, or even recognise this distinction between the NHS and private 
healthcare market has arguably characterised the HSCA 2012 reforms and offers some 
explanation of why their implementation is both controversial and difficult. This is 
considered further in light of the regulator’s focus on patients in Section III below.  
C.  Points of similarity underpinning competition in Dutch and English healthcare 
As noted previously, the significant distinction between insurance-based and taxation-
funded healthcare system models has implications for the scope for developing 
competition. Nevertheless, there are at least two significant similarities underpinning the 
development of competition policy and application of competition law within Dutch and 
English healthcare. 
                                                          
31 Rebecca Thomas, Dave West, “STPs will end the purchaser-provider split, says Stevens”, Health Service 
Journal, 27 February 2017. 
32 Julian Le Grand, “Quasi Markets: The Answer to Market Failure in Health Care?”, in P. Day, D.M. Fox, R. 
Maxwell and E. Scrivens, The State, Politics and Health: Essays for Rudolf Klein, (Oxford, 1996), ch.3. 
33 Will Bartlett and Julian Le Grand, “The Theory of Quasi-Markets” in  J. Le Grand and W. Bartlett (eds.), Quasi-
Markets and Social Policy, (London, 1993), ch.2.  
34  Department of Health, ‘The Government’s Mandate to NHS England for 2017-2018’, March 2017. Para 1.1. 
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Firstly, both countries are (currently) EU Member States. At a fundamental level, this 
common heritage reveals the significance of solidarity – defined in limited terms for the 
purposes of the present discussion as universal access to necessary healthcare - as an 
organising principle for both Dutch and English healthcare demonstrates this. Solidarity 
represents the “ideational point” upon which EU Member State healthcare systems 
converge,35 regardless of where they fit within the wider typologies of insurance-based / 
taxation-funded healthcare system. It also marks a contrast with healthcare in the United 
States, where competition is considered to be more developed because efficiency concerns 
have been prioritised over equity.36  
In terms of the legal framework, EU membership is also notable for highlighting an absence 
of EU-level harmonisation in healthcare (as distinct from other sectors such as 
telecommunications or energy), and the consideration that healthcare system organisation 
is a Member State competence.37 While this suggests that individual Member States have 
some freedom to experiment with market-based reforms,38 this may be constrained by 
reforms such as public-private interactions (inadvertently) triggering application of general 
competition law.39 This highlights that the EU competition law framework provides a broad 
basis upon which comparative analysis in this area can build. 
This EU competition law framework comprises two broad distinctions: between healthcare 
providers and purchasers, and between healthcare delivered in line with the principle of 
universal access and healthcare which may be considered supplementary to this. 40 In very 
general terms, healthcare providers have been deemed subject to competition law,41 while 
                                                          
35 Tamara K. Hervey, ‘Public Health Services and EU Law’, Chapter 7 in Marise Cremona (eds), Market 
Integration and Public Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2011). Page 186.  
36 Martin Gaynor, ‘Competition in Hospital Services’, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs 
Competition Committee, Working Party No.2 on Competition and Regulation, DAF/COMP/WP2(2012)3 06 Feb 
2012.  
37 Article 168(7) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
38 Arianna Andreangeli, ‘Healthcare Services, the EU Single Market and Beyond: Meeting Local Needs in an 
Open Economy – How Much Market or How Little Market?’, [2016] Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 43(2), 
145-172. 
39 For further discussion, see Tony Prosser, ‘EU competition law and public services’ in Elias Mossialos, Govin 
Permanand, Rita Baeten, Tamara Hervey (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European 
Union Law and Policy (CUP 2010).  
40 See further Johan W. van de Gronden and Catalin S. Rusu, “EU competition law and policy and health 
systems”, in T.K. Hervey, C.A. Young and L.E.Bishop (eds.), Research Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy 
(Cheltenham, 2017), ch.11. 
41 Case C-475-99, Ambulanz Glöckner [2001] ECR I-8089. 
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purchasing activities in the context of delivering universal access to healthcare have been considered 
exempt.42 These distinctions are reflected in the development of competition policy within 
Dutch and English healthcare.43  In essence, Dutch competition law is applicable to 
healthcare providers and health insurers,44 while in England, the Competition and Markets 
Authority has drawn a distinction between private providers working in the private 
healthcare market (category 4) and in the NHS (category 2) in its guidance on competition 
law.45 
Secondly, as noted in the motivation for this analysis, a fundamental feature of the 
development of competition policy in both countries has been the influence of the experience 
of liberalising other sectors.  
This might be interpreted in terms of similarities between healthcare and other sectors such 
as energy. If so, such comparison is arguably tenuous: distinctions are quickly revealed by the 
complexity of healthcare provision, which relates not only to the variety of providers and 
services, but also the difficulty of measuring quality (relative to technical standards applied in 
other markets) and the tension between competition and integrated healthcare provision. 46 
Unsurprisingly, caution has been urged with drawing comparisons with other sectors as these 
are better suited to identifying issues in need of resolution, rather than suggesting the 
appropriateness of a “model” of utility regulation.47     
However, a more pertinent comparison emerges with the sense of a wider cultural shift in 
the premise that sectoral regulation is a temporary feature within an overarching direction 
of travel towards a competitive marketplace overseen exclusively by a competition 
authority. This is evidenced, inter alia, in criticism by competition lawyers of the regulator’s 
role, and in the suggestion at the outset of the 2006 reforms by Edith Schippers, now 
Minister for Health, Wellbeing and Sport, that the Dutch Healthcare Authority’s competition 
                                                          
42 Case C-205/03, FENIN [2006] ECR I-6295. 
43 This is developed further and examined in detail in Mary Guy, Competition Policy in Healthcare Systems – A 
Comparative Study of the Netherlands and England (Intersentia, forthcoming 2018). 
44 Johan van de Gronden and Erika Szyszczak, “Introducing Competition Principles into Health Care Through EU 
Law and Policy: A Case Study of the Netherlands” (2014) 22(2) Med. L. R. 238. 
45 CMA, ’60-second summary – Private medical practitioners: information on competition law’, 3 December 
2015. 
46 Anna Dixon, Tony Harrison, Claire Mundle, “Economic regulation in healthcare – what can we learn from 
other regulators?” The King’s Fund, November 2011. 
47 Lindsay Stirton, “Back to the Future? Lessons on the Pro-Competitive Regulation of Health 
Services” (2014) 22(2) Med.L.R.180. 
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function would ultimately be subsumed into the Authority for Consumers and Markets.48 
This wider cultural comparison is both reminiscent of the purpose of UK sectoral regulation 
being to “hold the fort” pending the arrival of competition,49 and finds reflection in the 
Netherlands by the balancing of “competition where possible, regulation where necessary” 
in the context of the development of market regulation within the 2006 reforms.50 
Interestingly, the actual experience of other sectors – where regulation has proved a more 
permanent feature than originally envisaged – appears to have been overlooked in 
designing the competition focus of the healthcare regulators. Rather, at first glance, this 
temporary characteristic of sectoral regulation appears borne out in the Netherlands, where 
the majority of the Dutch Healthcare Authority’s competition powers have recently been 
transferred in practice to the Authority for Consumers and Markets. However, this does not 
resolve more fundamental questions about ex ante and ex post intervention: it is simply in 
the hands of a single agency when to act and what tools to use.  
 It is acknowledged that this comparative analysis is shaped by factors over and above 
substantive law. However, a comparative law approach is fundamental to understanding the 
derivation of Dutch and English healthcare competition policy ultimately from EU 
competition law and the scope for divergent approaches to this – a concept termed “Euro-
national competition rules for healthcare”.51 
D. Framing the discussion: the applicability of competition law as a starting-point for 
defining the framework within which the sectoral regulators operate 
The foregoing overview of similarities and differences between the development of 
competition in Dutch and English healthcare provides a helpful starting-point for 
understanding the framework within which the sectoral regulators (and competition 
                                                          
48 As discussed by S. van der Heul and F. Cornelissen, “Markttoezicht in de gezondheidszorg na wijziging Wmg” 
(“Market regulation in healthcare after Dutch Healthcare (Market Regulation) Act 2006 (Wmg) amendments”), 
Markt & Mededinging (2016) 5, 175. 
49 Stephen Littlechild, ‘Regulation of British Telecommunications’ Profitability’, Department of Trade and 
Industry, London, 1984. Para 4.11. 
50 Kamerstukken II, 2004-05, 30 186, 3 “Regels inzake marktordening, doelmatigheid en beheerste 
kostenontwikkeling op het gebied van de gezondheidszorg (Wet marktordening gezondheidszorg)”, Nr.3 
Memorie van Toelichting. (Second Chamber documentation, Parliamentary Session 2005-06, 30 186, 3 
(Explanatory Memorandum) “Rules governing market organisation, efficiency and managed cost development 
in healthcare (Dutch Healthcare (Market Regulation) Act 2006 (Wmg)”). 
51 Van de Gronden and Szyszczak (2014) supra n44. 
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authorities) work, which in turn helps to shape the competition focus of the sectoral 
regulators and their relationship with the competition authorities.  
This framework is determined primarily by the applicability of competition law52 and may 
lead to two general inferences which can be tested in light of the further factors considered 
in this article, namely the regulators’ apparent focus on patients and the evolving role of 
ministerial oversight and expanding role of the competition authority. 
One inference is that where competition law is applicable, we may expect to see greater 
intervention by the competition authority and a reduced role for the regulator and limited 
ministerial oversight.  
Conversely, a second inference arises where the applicability of competition law is in 
question, so we may expect to see less competition authority intervention and a greater 
role for regulator and ministerial oversight.  
As regards the underlying applicability of competition law, interesting and potentially 
significant distinctions between the Dutch and English systems are already in evidence.  
In the Netherlands, there is greater scope for competition within its insurance-based model 
and in principle the applicability of competition law to both healthcare providers and 
purchasers is relatively uncontroversial. The relationship between the Authority for 
Consumers and Markets and the Dutch Healthcare Authority appeared initially predicated 
on a “separate powers” model. Thus the Authority for Consumers and Markets had 
exclusive competence to apply competition law, but the Dutch Healthcare Authority’s 
competition powers – intervention regarding significant market power and the drafting of 
terms of healthcare and tariff-related agreements – were intended primarily as 
complementary to this. While the current transfer of the significant market power 
competence removes this sense of separation, it is still evident in the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority retaining its aforementioned drafting competence. Furthermore, a separation 
remains evident in whether ex ante or ex post intervention is desirable – that is, whether 
the Authority for Consumers and Markets will use its new significant market power 
competence or take action in connection with the prohibition on abuse of dominance.  
                                                          
52 A separate framework emerges in connection with merger control and the assessment of hospital mergers.  
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In England, there is less scope for competition within the NHS taxation-funded model and 
the applicability of competition law vis-à-vis the NHS (but not the private healthcare sector) 
remains unclear, even controversial.53 The choice of a “concurrent powers” model for NHS 
Improvement or the Competition and Markets Authority to have equal competence in 
applying competition law to cases involving “the provision of healthcare services” under 
section 72 HSCA 2012 is therefore curious. It suggests that NHS Improvement and the 
Competition and Markets Authority have equal oversight of the NHS and private healthcare 
sectors, something which is certainly not borne out in practice. Although the White Paper 
preceding the HSCA 2012 clearly articulated ambitious proposals for the Competition and 
Markets Authority to have oversight of the NHS, these were ultimately diminished by the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA 2013) reforms54 of the wider concurrency 
regime and specifically the Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014, which 
reserve cases concerning “matters relating to the provision of health care services for the 
purposes of the NHS in England” to NHS Improvement.55 This effectively enshrines the 
situation which existed prior to the HSCA 2012 reforms, whereby the Competition and 
Markets Authority’s predecessors (the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition 
Commission) had oversight of the private healthcare sector (categories 3 and 4), and the 
Department of Health oversaw the NHS (categories 1 and 2). This represents a variation on a 
“separate powers” model, where the Competition and Markets Authority applies general 
competition law to providers in the private healthcare sector, and NHS Improvement applies 
a “NHS-specific” regime (the Choice and Competition condition of the NHS Provider 
Licence56 and the Regulation 10 prohibition on anticompetitive behaviour of the National 
Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) Regulations (No.2) 2013)57 
within the context of the NHS “quasi-market”. 
                                                          
53 See, for example, Duncan Sinclair, ‘“Undertakings” in competition law at the public-private interface – an 
unhealthy situation’, [2014] ECLR 35(4), 167-171. Okeoghene Odudu, 'Are State-owned healthcare providers 
undertakings subject to competition law?' [2011] 32(5) European Competition Law Review 231-241. 
54 See the House of Lords debates - Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill, HL Deb, 12 December 2012, Col 
GC362.  
55 Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/536, Regulations 5 and 8.  
56 Monitor, The New NHS Provider Licence, 14 February 2013. Annex: NHS Provider Licence Standard 
Conditions. 
57 SI 2013/500. 
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In light of the aforementioned inferences, the foregoing suggests,  as might be expected, 
the role of the competition authority regarding the application of competition law has 
assumed greater significance in the Netherlands, but not in England, where the regulator 
and sector-specific regime appears to play a larger role in connection with the NHS, not only 
relative to the competition authority, but also in terms of extending its remit beyond its 
competition focus. 
However, two further factors play a role in shaping the competition focus of the regulators 
and their relationship with the competition authorities, namely, the regulators’ focus on 
patients and the evolving role of ministerial oversight in connection with the competition 
reforms. These are now considered. 
III. THE REGULATORS’ FOCUS  
Both the Dutch Healthcare Authority and NHS Improvement have a distinct focus articulated 
in statute which appears directed towards patients  as distinct from, for example, healthcare 
providers or purchasers operating within their respective markets. This focus has been 
considered both a source of legitimacy58 and grounds for concern about possible 
contradiction of competition law standards.59 
In view of the foregoing discussion of the development of competition and applicability of 
competition law, it might be anticipated that the Dutch Healthcare Authority’s focus may be 
more market-oriented and focused on the interests of policyholders, while NHS 
Improvement’s focus may perhaps be directed towards patient interests. 
A. The Netherlands 
From its inception, the Dutch Healthcare Authority has had a duty to promote the “general 
consumer interest” under Article 3(4) Dutch Healthcare (Market Regulation) Act 2006.60 The 
Dutch Healthcare Authority has interpreted the “general consumer interest” as 
encompassing the public values of accessibility, affordability and quality, and these have 
been elaborated further in different ways. For example, “affordability” has both micro and 
macro dimensions, relating respectively to affordable basic insurance and a lack of 
                                                          
58 See Sauter (2009), supra n15. 
59 Albert Sánchez Graells, “New rules for health care procurement in the UK: a critical assessment from the 
perspective of EU economic law”, (2015) P.P.L.R 1 16. 
60 Wet marktordening gezondheidszorg (Wmg) 2006. 
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reduction in purchasing power or dramatic increase in public spending.61 “Accessibility” 
distinguishes physical and financial aspects,62 and the Dutch Healthcare Authority has 
elaborated this as meaning access to the right care within a reasonable distance and period 
of time, based on norms regarding waiting time for non-emergency care and that ability to 
pay is no barrier to receiving medical care, respectively. “Quality” in connection with the 
Dutch Healthcare Authority63 relates to the proper functioning of markets. It has been 
suggested that tension may arise with trade-offs emerging between the individual values64 
of accessibility, affordability and quality.  Nevertheless, the interplay between accessibility, 
affordability and quality has provided a framework for Dutch Healthcare Authority 
assessment of significant market power and its contract intervention competences.65 It 
appears that the Authority for Consumers and Markets would similarly need to have regard 
to the “general consumer interest” with the transfer of the significant market power 
competence.66 Nevertheless, with the wider refocusing of competition in Dutch healthcare, 
for example regarding the assessment of hospital mergers, the Authority for Consumers and 
Markets has called for further clarification of what it terms “public interests”67 – which 
appear to comprise accessibility, affordability and quality – in connection with the 
competition rules. 
This definition of the “general consumer interest” in terms of public values suggests an 
interesting tension between a market focus on the one hand, and a focus on patients on the 
other which is considered further below. 
B. England 
Under section 62(1) HSCA 2012, NHS Improvement has a main general duty to “protect and 
promote the interests of people who use health care services by promoting provision of 
                                                          
61 NZa, ‘Visiedocument: (In) het belang van de consument’ (‘Vision Document: (In) the general consumer 
interest’) (November 2007). Section 2.1. 
62 Ibid. 
63 As distinct from, for example, the Dutch quality regulator (the IGZ). 
64 See Sauter (2009), supra n15. 
65 Also seen in Dutch Healthcare Authority Opinions within merger assessment between 2006 and 2015. 
66 Kamerstukken II, 2015-16, 34 445, 3 - Wijziging van de Wet marktordening gezondheidszorg en enkele 
andere wetten in verband met aanpassingen van de tarief- en prestatieregulering en het markttoezicht op het 
terrein van de gezondheidszorg. Nr. 3 Memorie van Toelichting. (Second Chamber documentation, 
Parliamentary Session 2015-16, 34 445, 3 - Amendments to the Wmg and other laws to apply tariff regulation 
and market regulation in healthcare, Document No.3, Explanatory Memorandum). Page 40. 
67 See ACM, ‘Position Paper Autoriteit Consument en Markt Rondetafelgesprek “Kwaliteit loont”’ (‘ACM 
Position Paper on the “Quality Pays” roundtable discussion’). 17 April 2015. 
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healthcare services which (a) is economic, efficient and effective, and (b) maintains or 
improves the quality of the services.” The terminology of “people who use healthcare 
services” appears somewhat unwieldy as “healthcare services” appear to extend beyond the 
NHS.68 Prima facie, this suggests that the general duty is owed to all patients in England, 
whether accessing NHS and/or private healthcare services. So this may include instances 
where a patient receives a hip replacement operation in an NHS hospital (as an NHS patient), 
but for reasons of personal convenience may seek follow-up physiotherapy with a private 
provider69 (as a private patient).  
However, with regard to competition in the NHS, section 62(3) HSCA 2012 qualifies this 
general duty thus: 
“[NHS Improvement] must exercise its functions with a view to preventing anti-competitive 
behaviour in the provision of healthcare services for the purposes of the NHS which is against 
the interests of people who use such services”. 
This clearly directs NHS Improvement’s general duty towards NHS patients (as “people who 
use such services”), which is consistent with its practice of focusing on the NHS, not the 
private healthcare sector. As “provision of healthcare services for the purposes of the NHS” 
(whether by NHS or private providers) represents an area (categories 1 and 2) where the 
extent of the applicability of general competition law is questionable, this is also consistent 
with the existence of the aforementioned separate regime for the NHS “quasi-market”.  
The regulators’ focus on patients entails two further considerations – regarding a coherent 
narrative underpinning competition reforms and recognising dual identities of patients – 
which are now examined. 
C. A coherent narrative? 
Overall, the Dutch Healthcare Authority’s focus on the “general consumer interest” has 
been interpreted as relating to a general body of consumers and long-term interests, thus 
ensuring the effective working of the market mechanism.70 This is logical as the competition 
                                                          
68 Section 64(3) HSCA 2012 defines “healthcare services” as “[…] all forms of health care provided for 
individuals, whether relating to physical or mental health […]; and […] it does not matter if a health care 
service is also an adult social care service”. 
69 See Department of Health guidance supra n27, example cited at page 10.  
70 Thus has been related to the market failure rationale for regulation. See Sauter (2009), supra n15.  
18 
 
reforms in Dutch healthcare comprise a consistent market narrative (at least relative to the 
English reforms), underpinned inter alia by the suggestion above that the Authority for 
Consumers and Markets will have similar regard to the “general consumer interest”.  
In contrast, it is difficult to see such coherence emerging within NHS Improvement’s focus 
on “people who use healthcare services” which appears both to reference the interaction 
between NHS and private healthcare provision, and yet in practice to mean “NHS patients” 
as s.62(3) HSCA 2012 explicitly references the NHS “quasi-market”. This can be explained in 
part by the refocusing of competition in the face of significant criticism during the 
enactment of the HSCA 201271 – and expressed in the obligation to prevent anticompetitive 
behaviour, not promote competition (in contrast to other sectoral regulators).  
D. “Dual identity” - patients/policyholders, patients/taxpayers 
A common point between the regulators’ focus, despite functioning within very different 
systems, is the apparent missed opportunity to engage explicitly with the “dual identity” of 
patients.  
In the Netherlands this comprises a tension between policyholders (consumers of health 
insurance) and patients.72 The regulator’s focus may vary according to whether it is 
considering the health insurance market (thus  insurance policyholders as “consumers”) or 
the healthcare provision market (thus patients as “consumers”) – it being recalled that 
competition was intended to develop from the health insurance market to the healthcare 
provision market.73  
This sense of a dual identity is illustrated by a rejection of a controversial legislative proposal 
which precipitated a near collapse of the Dutch Liberal/Labour coalition government in 
December 2014.74 The legislative proposal included a recommendation to amend Article 13 
Dutch Health Insurance Act 200675 which mitigates the limited choice of providers available 
                                                          
71 NHS Future Forum, ‘Choice and Competition – Delivering Real Choice. A report from the NHS Future Forum’, 
June 2011. 
72 See Sauter (2009), supra n15. 
73 See Sauter (2011), supra n26. 
74 EUObserver, ”Dutch PM misses EU summit to save coalition”, 18 December 2014. 
<https://euobserver.com/news/126994>. 
75 Contained in a legislative proposal mainly concerned with a prohibition of integration of healthcare 
providers and health insurers. Kamerstukken II, 2011-12, 33 362, 2 – Wijziging van de Wet marktordening 
gezondheidszorg en enkele andere wetten, teneinde te voorkomen dat zorgverzekeraars zelf zorg verlenen of 
zorg laten aanbieden door zorgaanbieders waarin zij zelf zeggenschap hebben. Nr. 2 Voorstel van wet. (Second 
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to patients with cheaper “benefits in kind” policies.76 On the one hand, amending this 
provision may have led to lower premia, a benefit to insured parties and in keeping with the 
apparent overall aim of competition in Dutch healthcare of reducing costs. However, on the 
other hand, precluding choice of provider may have negative impacts on a patient’s health 
outcomes. Thus potential curtailment of “free choice of provider” not only proved decisive in 
the voting down of the legislative proposal, but also remains a sensitive issue.77 This example 
from 2014 suggests that there can well be a tension – or at least a lack of alignment – in the 
dual identity between “patient interests” on the one hand, which benefit from maintaining 
the “free choice of provider”, and “policyholder” interests on the other, which would benefit 
from cheaper premia. With the current refocusing of competition within a wider 
modernisation of Dutch healthcare, the Minister for Health, Wellbeing and Sport has 
referenced the interests of both “patients” and “policyholders”,78 which arguably suggests an 
awareness of the scope for dual identity. 
In England, this “dual identity” comprises patients and taxpayers. While NHS Improvement 
has not explicitly recognised this, the Chief Executive of NHS England has previously 
articulated the organisation’s motivation as being to “think like a patient, act like a 
taxpayer”. 79 In view of NHS Improvement’s commitment to the NHS as a taxation-funded 
service free at the point of delivery80 and its close partnership with NHS England, the failure 
to couch its general duty in terms of “patients and taxpayers” in the HSCA 2012 appears 
overlooked, even remiss, for at least three reasons.  
                                                          
Chamber documentation, Parliamentary Session 2011-12. 33 362, 2 – Amendments to the Wmg and other 
laws to prohibit health insurers from providing healthcare themselves, or allowing care to be delivered by 
providers in which they have a controlling interest. Document No. 2, Legislative Proposal). 
76 By requiring insurers to offer some degree of compensation if a patient chooses (subsequent) treatment 
with a provider who has no contract with the insurance company. 
77 See, for example, discussion of a recent case in which this issue arose. “Twijfel over echt vrije artsenkeuze” 
(“Questions about real free choice of provider”), Commentaar, Het Financiële Dagblad, 5 Januari 2017. 
Furthermore, financial advisor websites include explanations of the “free choice of provider”. The VvAA, the 
largest network of legal and financial support for members of the medical profession in the Netherlands, also 
supported a campaign following the development of the right to a  “free choice of provider” - 
https://www.vvaa.nl/levensloop/vrije-artsenkeuze/manifest  
78 Edith Schippers, ‘Kwaliteit loont’ (‘Quality Pays’), Letter from the Minister for Health, Wellbeing and Sport to 
the Chairman of the Second Chamber, 6 February 2015. 
79 Simon Stevens (CEO of NHS England) speech, 1 April 2014.  
80 Monitor, ‘Monitor’s Strategy 2014-17 – Helping to redesign healthcare provision in England’.   
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Firstly, competition within the English NHS predominantly comprises competition for the 
market, thus commissioning activity linked with securing value for money for taxpayers, as 
distinct from competition in the market, linked with consumer choice.  
Secondly, there is arguably a tension between the respective identities of “patient” and 
“taxpayer”. Thus taxpayers’ interests may best be served by a continued commitment in 
practical terms to an NHS which remains free at the point of use and ensures continuity of 
care. However, individual patients may also value a continued ability to move between the 
NHS and private healthcare sectors to receive treatment as needed – which suggests a 
scenario closer to that experienced in other sectors than the limited patient choice policies 
which offer a choice of NHS or private provider, for example, for a first outpatient 
appointment regarding elective care.81 
Thirdly, the concept of a “dual identity” is found in economic regulation in other sectors yet, 
curiously, has not influenced the design of NHS Improvement. It can be considered that there 
is sufficient precedent in the dual duty of the UK communications regulator (Ofcom) to 
consumers and citizens82 to have justified NHS Improvement adopting a similar “dual identity” 
approach.83  
However, the lack of explicit reference to taxpayers may be explained by at least two factors.  
Firstly, the refocusing of competition within the implementation of the HSCA 2012 included 
an emphasis on competition on quality, rather than price competition. This may prompt an 
inference that competition on quality is something patients may be responsive to (in light of 
information asymmetry between patients and providers), whereas taxpayers may favour 
competition on price insofar as this can achieve value for money.  
                                                          
81 Enshrined by Regulation 12, National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) 
Regulations (No.2) 2013 (SI 2013 No.500) and Regulations 47-49, National Health Service Commissioning Board 
and Clinical Commissioning Groups (Responsibilities and Standing Rules) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012 No.2996). 
The “right” of NHS patients to exercise choice is also referenced in The NHS Constitution (July 2015), “Patients 
and the Public – your rights and NHS pledges to you”, page 9. 
82 Section 3(1) Communications Act 2003. Discussed in Tony Prosser, “Regulation and Social Solidarity”, (2006) 
Journal of Law and Society 33(3) 364. 
83 This comparison with other sectoral regulators is perhaps more logical than other agencies, which may 
routinely refer to “patients and taxpayers” in relation to the NHS. See, for example, Public Accounts 




Secondly, the taxpayers’ and patients’ interests may align to such a degree that the distinction 
becomes superfluous. It has been suggested that, in public service delivery, the preferences 
of a state’s citizens as taxpayers are unlikely to differ significantly from their preferences as 
users.84 So a good public service may be simultaneously responsive to users’ needs and 
accountable to taxpayers. However, interests may differ with regard to geographical 
distribution such that taxpayers in one part of the country subsidize public service users in 
another85 – an example being the “postcode lottery” allocation of drugs. 
A third consideration may be that as NHS Improvement’s role is to operate alongside the 
Competition and Markets Authority in policing anticompetitive behaviour (evident in the 
existence of concurrent powers), their respective focus of the two agencies may reflect each 
other. 
Overall, the regulators’ explicit focus – whether on the “general consumer interest” or 
“patients’ interests” – can be conceptualised as a means of incorporating public interests 
within competition-based tests as these may otherwise receive, or be perceived to receive, 
less attention – something that may raise concerns from a political perspective. Thus, from a 
strict competition perspective, there is an inference that it is possible to regard not only 
quality, but also arguably other consumer values of access, affordability and choice, as 
dimensions of efficiency.86 However, the current intention for the Authority for Consumers 
and Markets to focus on the “general consumer interest” in the context of significant market 
power investigations suggests its ongoing importance in this regard.87  
However, concerns about a perceived lack of alignment between NHS Improvement’s general 
duty to prevent anticompetitive behaviour which is against the interests of NHS patients 
under s.62(3) HSCA 2012 and the standards of general competition law88 are perhaps less 
                                                          
84 See Julian Le Grand, The Other Invisible Hand – Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition, 
(Woodstock, 2007).  
85 Ibid. 
86 Wolf Sauter, “The Impact of EU Competition Law on National Healthcare Systems” (2013) E.L. Rev. 38(4) 457. 
87 This appears to mark a contrast with the reformed merger control, where the need to pay attention to 
“public interests” is suggested to be the exception, rather than the rule. Kamerstukken II, 2015-16, 34 445, 3 – 
“Wijziging van de Wet marktordening gezondheidszorg en enkele andere wetten in verband met aanpassingen 
van de tarief- en prestatieregulering en het markttoezicht op het terrein van de gezondheidszorg“, Nr. 3 
Memorie van Toelichting. (Second Chamber documentation, Parliamentary Session 2015-16, 34 445, 3 - 
Amendments to the Wmg and other laws to apply tariff regulation and market regulation in healthcare 
(Explanatory Memorandum)). Page 23. 
88 For a critical view, see Sánchez Graells (2015), supra n59. 
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persuasive in view of the NHS’ “quasi-market” status. Admittedly the wording of s.62(3) HSCA 
2012 suggests that a distinction can be drawn between “good” anticompetitive behaviour 
which may well be in patients’ interests, and “bad” anticompetitive behaviour which is 
contrary to patients’ interests. However, this inference between “good” and “bad” 
anticompetitive behaviour can simply be read as another way of delineating the scope for 
intervention, which is consistent with the refocusing of competition within the NHS arising 
out of the enactment of the HSCA 2012 and arguably an appropriate approach for a “quasi-
market”. 
Ultimately, it may be considered that questions of “dual identity” are also shaped by the 
evolving role of ministerial oversight and the competition authorities’ expanding roles. These 
are now considered. 
IV. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF MINISTERIAL OVERSIGHT AND EXPANDING ROLE OF THE 
COMPETITION AUTHORITY 
In both the Netherlands and England, the competition focus of the sectoral regulator and its 
relationship with the competition authority has developed alongside evolving ministerial 
oversight of healthcare provision.  
In general terms, this can be conceptualised as a simple continuum which has as its starting 
point “the provision of a public health service [as] the quintessential public service”89 
overseen by government and its end point a market-based system overseen exclusively by 
the competition authority. This is influenced by the narrative of the purpose of (UK) sectoral 
regulation being to “hold the fort” pending the arrival of competition,90 and the implication 
that regulation is inherently second best91 within such a system.  
The apparent intended direction of travel towards a competitive marketplace suggests that, 
in terms of oversight, it would be logical to expect a reduction in ministerial oversight and 
an expansion in the competition authority’s role in connection with the relative certainty 
surrounding the applicability of competition law (and inferences outlined in Section II). 
Indeed, this offers a framework to consider the developments in the Netherlands and 
England. 
                                                          
89 Prosser (2005), supra n10, p.7. 
90 Littlechild (1984), supra n49. 
91 See Prosser (2006), supra n82.  
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A. The Netherlands 
The greater scope for developing competition and the lesser controversy surrounding the 
applicability of competition law in Dutch healthcare suggests that reduced ministerial 
oversight and an expanded Authority for Consumers and Markets role could be anticipated. 
The latter may be true in view of the transfer of the Dutch Healthcare Authority’s significant 
market power competence, as this is intended to refocus the application of competition 
powers with regard to the healthcare sector.92 However, as regards the former, it is to be 
noted that other aspects of competition – such as determining which hospital service prices 
may be opened up to competition rather than remaining subject to a government tariff – 
will remain with the Dutch Healthcare Authority and the Minister. Furthermore, ministerial 
oversight arguably appears to be assuming a different dynamic vis-à-vis the Authority for 
Consumers and Markets, rather than diminishing per se. This is because the Minister for 
Health, Wellbeing and Sport will retain powers to issue policy rules as the “responsible 
Minister” 93 (it being noted that the Authority for Consumers and Markets is overseen 
ultimately by the Minister for Economic Affairs), apparently in keeping with shared 
regulation in other sectors. The Authority for Consumers and Markets’ response has been 
(appropriately) to define its scope for intervention in terms of the applicability of 
competition law,94 acknowledging that the existing substantive law may be insufficient to 
achieve governmental ambitions regarding competition in healthcare.  
B. England 
In light of the lesser scope for developing competition within the English NHS (as distinct 
from the private healthcare sector), it might be considered that Ministerial oversight may 
remain the same (if not increase) and, correspondingly, the role of the Competition and 
Markets Authority would diminish. However, an interesting combination of circumstances 
has emerged to question such an interpretation.  
                                                          
92 Edith Schippers, “Kabinetsreactie rapport commissie Borstlap en evaluatie Wmg en NZa”.(“Cabinet response 
to the Borstlap and AEF reports”, Letter from the Minister for Health, Wellbeing and Sport to the Chairman of 
the First Chamber), 2 April 2015. 
93 See Schippers (2015), supra n78. 
94 ACM, “Spreekpunten Henk Don bij rondetafelgesprek ‘kwaliteit loont’ in de Tweede Kamer op 17 april 
2015”. (“Points for discussion by Henk Don at the “Quality Pays” round table discussion in the Second 
Chamber 17 April 2015”). 
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On the one hand, the wider HSCA 2012 reforms included the establishment of NHS England 
as an independent body with responsibility for setting strategic policy direction for the NHS 
in England. This reduced the scope for intervention by the Secretary of State for Health in 
apparent achievement of a long-standing ambition to “de-politicise” the NHS.95 Although 
curiously little attempt was made to align NHS England’s ambitions with NHS Improvement’s 
competition remit in the drafting of the HSCA 2012, the combining of the two agencies is 
increasingly called for.96  
A further instance of the reduction in intervention by the Secretary of State for Health is 
evident in the decision to enshrine as secondary legislation previous policy guidance. This 
has been termed the “juridification” of matters of public policy,97 specifically, encouraging 
private sector delivery of NHS services. In consequence, NHS and private providers have 
standing to challenge, inter alia, the awarding of contracts or the referral of NHS patients 
and ask NHS Improvement for a determination under the National Health Service 
(Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) Regulations (No.2) 2013. Although few 
cases have emerged thus far, while such provision exists, it offers an alternative recourse to 
the public procurement rules98 or general competition law (insofar as this is applicable). 
Overall, it might be considered that there has indeed been a reduction in Ministerial 
oversight of the English NHS, however counterintuitive this may be with regard to the 
competition reforms. 
On the other hand, the role of the Competition and Markets Authority has, paradoxically, 
been both restricted and expanded by the HSCA 2012 reforms. The original ambition of the 
White Paper preceding the HSCA 2012 was for the Competition and Markets Authority to 
have oversight of the NHS inter alia by sharing concurrent powers with NHS Improvement 
                                                          
95 Nicholas Timmins, “’Teflon’ Jeremy Hunt and the de-politicisation of the NHS”, The King’s Fund Blog, 22 
February 2017. However the idea of, and desire for, the day-to-day running of the English NHS to be removed 
from Ministerial control is arguably not new and has been endorsed by both Labour and Conservative 
governments. Points of divergence emerge in connection with how, as opposed to whether, this might be 
achieved. Thus previous Secretaries of State for Health have revealed differing views about the establishment 
of NHS England and the associated restriction of the role of politicians. See the discussions in Nicholas 
Timmins, Edward Davies, Glaziers and Window Breakers – Secretaries of State for Health in their own words. 
(The Health Foundation, London, 2015), pages 160-164.  
96 For example, by a House of Lords Select Committee. See supra n20. 
97 For an excellent discussion, see Davies (2013) supra n18. 
98 S. Smith, D. Owens, E. Heard, “New procurement legislation for English healthcare bodies – the National 




with regard to applying competition law. The aforementioned changes brought by the 
Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014 have effectively reflected the pre-
HSCA 2012 situation insofar as NHS Improvement has sole oversight of the NHS in practical 
terms. Overall, this would seem to suggest a restriction of the Competition and Markets 
Authority’s oversight of the NHS.  
However, it is important to note that the 2014 Concurrency Regulations restrictions apply 
only to the concurrent powers under section 72 HSCA 2012 in relation to competition law. 
There are at least two further ways in which Competition and Markets Authority oversight 
of the NHS might be considered to have expanded. 
Firstly, section 73 HSCA 2012 provides for the Competition and Markets Authority and NHS 
Improvement to share concurrent powers relating to market investigations under Part 4 
Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02). Although this provision has yet to be tested, by analogy with 
general Competition and Markets Authority guidance, it would appear that either the 
Competition and Markets Authority or NHS Improvement could carry out a market study to 
establish whether the NHS (quasi-) market99 (presumably defined as categories 1 and 2 to 
distinguish it from the private healthcare market of categories 3 and 4) is working well. If 
not, either the Competition and Markets Authority or NHS Improvement could make a 
reference to the Competition and Markets Authority Board for a market investigation, an in-
depth examination of whether there is an “adverse effect on competition”.100 While this 
division of effort may seem less contentious than applying competition law, it could still lead 
to the imposition of requirements on NHS or private providers delivering NHS services. 
Therefore having explicit Competition and Markets Authority intervention in such a “market 
developing” role vis-à-vis the English NHS may nevertheless prove extremely controversial, 
so it is questionable whether this power will be used, particularly in light of recent 
movements away from a competition-based system towards integrated care models.  
Secondly, in a further contrast to the explicit restriction of Competition and Markets 
Authority competence regarding the application of competition law, a lesser-noted, but 
                                                          
99 Presumably defined as categories 1 and 2 to distinguish it from the private healthcare market of categories 3 
and 4. 
100 CMA, ‘Market Studies and Market Investigations: Supplemental Guidance on the CMA’s approach’, January 
2014 (revised July 2017), CMA 3. 
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nevertheless potentially significant expansion of its oversight function is evident in other 
competition-related aspects of NHS provision. Thus the Competition and Markets Authority 
serves as a review body in cases where NHS Improvement proposes to include or modify a 
special condition in the NHS Provider Licence but this is rejected by the applicant or licence 
holder,101 and where consultations yield objections to the National Tariff Payment System 
agreed by NHS England and NHS Improvement.102 While the former intervention power is 
new, the latter was originally the preserve of the Department of Health, suggesting perhaps 
as much evidence of receding ministerial oversight as expansion of Competition and 
Markets Authority functions. However, what emerges from the foregoing is a complicated 
picture in which the relationship between NHS Improvement and the Competition and 
Markets Authority is not only dependent upon it sharing concurrent powers with regard to 
competition law under s.72 HSCA 2012, although a distinction is drawn between these and 
the separate roles under HSCA 2012 and the importance of maintaining the importance of 
the Competition and Markets Authority’s impartiality and fairness in carrying out those 
functions.103  
A further example of Competition and Markets Authority expansion vis-à-vis the English NHS 
is evident in connection with merger assessment, which has proved the most active area of 
competition in terms of the number of cases subsequent to the HSCA 2012 reforms.104 
Overall, there has been a clear, even substantial, receding of ministerial oversight of the 
NHS “quasi-market” with the creation of NHS England and NHS Improvement on the one 
hand, and the allocation of Competition and Markets Authority review functions on the 
other. The receding of ministerial oversight is thus indeed accompanied by an expansion of 
Competition and Markets Authority functions vis-à-vis the NHS “quasi-market”. While this 
would be consistent with the desire to move from healthcare provision overseen by 
government to a market-based system overseen by the competition authority, it is arguably 
counterintuitive in light of the nature of the NHS “quasi-market” and the political sensitivity 
                                                          
101 Health and Social Care Act 2012, s. 101. 
102 Health and Social Care Act 2012, s. 120(1)(b). 
103 CMA and NHS Improvement, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Competition and Markets 
Authority and NHS Improvement”, 1 April 2016. Paragraph 7. 
104 Section 79 HSCA 2012 provides that mergers involving NHS Foundation Trusts (typically hospitals) are 
subject to the general merger control regime of the Enterprise Act 2002. This is examined further in Guy 
(2018), supra n43. 
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surrounding this, which has arguably formed the basis for amending concurrent powers in 
respect of applying competition law under s.72 HSCA 2012. In light of the questionable 
extent of applicability of competition law to the English NHS, this might be considered a 
“belt and braces” approach to circumventing explicit Competition and Markets Authority 
intervention regarding the NHS. 
What emerges from the foregoing is that the intuition of a correlation between ministerial 
and competition authority oversight relative to scope for competition is not borne out in 
practice based on the experiences of the Netherlands and England thus far.  
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article started from the premise that the experience of other sectors as a starting-point 
for developing sectoral regulation in healthcare, and particularly the relationship between 
the Dutch Healthcare Authority and Authority for Consumers and Markets in the 
Netherlands and NHS Improvement and the Competition and Markets Authority in England, 
provided a template which was too simple. This premise has been explored by means of a 
comparative analysis examining two specific factors, namely the regulators’ focus on 
patients and the evolving role of ministerial oversight.   
Although the development of competition in both Dutch and English healthcare has been 
influenced by Enthoven’s model of “managed competition”, the varying extent to which 
competition is possible within an insurance-based model and a taxation-funded model 
arguably outweighs this. Consequently, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that 
transferring the regulator’s competition powers to the competition authority would be a 
logical step105 in both countries. Conversely, there may not necessarily exist a need for a 
strict separation of competition authority and regulator oversight where there is a single, 
unified “healthcare” sector as opposed to the distinctive interaction between the NHS 
“quasi-market” and the smaller supplementary private healthcare market. A general finding 
of this article is that such distinctions alone could justify a departure from regulatory models 
used in other sectors.  
                                                          
105 Previously argued for in the English context by Albert Sánchez Graells, ‘Monitor and the Competition and 
Markets Authority’, (2014) University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No.14-32. 
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Indeed, the differing nature of markets in Dutch and English healthcare go some way to 
explaining the difficulties surrounding the development of coherent narratives regarding the 
regulators’ focus on patients, as opposed to either purchasers of health insurance or 
taxpayers, or to NHS Commissioners in the English context. This demonstrates that parallels 
between “patients-as-consumers” and consumers of other services are at best limited. For 
example, there is a need to consider whether oversight values could or should differ 
depending on whether the focus is patients (as a proxy for consumers) or purchasers of 
healthcare or taxpayers, so a future development of this should acknowledge dual 
identities. While it is acknowledged that NHS procurement activity is fragmented, a more 
consistent narrative for competition reforms in English healthcare nevertheless emerges if 
“the NHS”, or “NHS patients” as a collective group, is regarded as a consumer of private 
healthcare services.  
Furthermore, the evolving landscape of ministerial oversight and the expanding role of the 
competition authorities beyond the application of competition law is arguably distinctive in 
healthcare in both countries. Indeed, what we are seeing is counterintuitive, with explicit 
ministerial oversight apparently greater in Dutch healthcare and seemingly minimal, even 
non-existent with regard to the English NHS. 
Finally, the framework established by EU law for developing competition in Member State 
healthcare systems is undoubtedly expansive: Member States have significant flexibility in 
deciding the degree and extent of market reforms.106 Thus far, the Dutch and English 
reforms have attempted to build on this framework by using the experience of other sectors 
to create regulatory relationships and tools. This has proved an insufficient basis and needs 
further elaboration in light, inter alia, of the factors analysed in this article.
 
                                                          
106 Andreangeli (2016) supra n38. 
